incentive bidding mechanism

基本解釋

Using mechanism design theory and marginal cost pricing theory, an incentive compatible bidding mechanism is introduced for power generation competition in electricity markets.
基於機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論和邊際成本定價(jià)理論，發(fā)展了一種具有激勵(lì)相容特性的發(fā)電市場競價(jià)機(jī)制。
According to mechanism design theory, a power bidding mechanism existing incentive and compatibility features is designed.
根據(jù)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論，設(shè)計(jì)了一種具有激勵(lì)相容特性的電力競價(jià)機(jī)制。
The second-price and first-price collusive bidding mechanism are found to be incentive compatible and efficient direct-revelation collusive mechanism.
本文在擴(kuò)展的獨(dú)立私有價(jià)值模型下，考慮第二價(jià)格和第一價(jià)格拍賣機(jī)制下的串通出價(jià)行爲(wèi)和賣方對串通出價(jià)的反映。