incentive bidding mechanism

基本解釋

Using mechanism design theory and marginal cost pricing theory, an incentive compatible bidding mechanism is introduced for power generation competition in electricity markets.
基於機制設(shè)計理論和邊際成本定價理論，發(fā)展了一種具有激勵相容特性的發(fā)電市場競價機制。
According to mechanism design theory, a power bidding mechanism existing incentive and compatibility features is designed.
根據(jù)機制設(shè)計理論，設(shè)計了一種具有激勵相容特性的電力競價機制。
The second-price and first-price collusive bidding mechanism are found to be incentive compatible and efficient direct-revelation collusive mechanism.
本文在擴展的獨立私有價值模型下，考慮第二價格和第一價格拍賣機制下的串通出價行爲(wèi)和賣方對串通出價的反映。